Surveillance of viral pathogens in Australia : Respiratory syncytial virus

This report published in Communicable Diseases Intelligence Volume 27, No 1, March 2003 contains information on respiratory syncytial virus, which is a major cause of lower respiratory tract infection in young children

Murray Valley encephalitis virus surveillance and control initiatives in Australia.

Mechanisms for monitoring Murray Valley encephalitis (MVE) virus activity include surveillance of human cases, surveillance for activity in sentinel animals, monitoring of mosquito vectors and monitoring of weather conditions. The monitoring of human cases is only one possible trigger for public health action and the additional surveillance systems are used in concert to signal the risk of human disease, often before the appearance of human cases. Mosquito vector surveillance includes mosquito trapping for speciation and enumeration of mosquitoes to monitor population sizes and relative composition. Virus isolation from mosquitoes can also be undertaken. Monitoring of weather conditions and vector surveillance determines whether there is a potential for MVE activity to occur. Virus isolation from trapped mosquitoes is necessary to define whether MVE is actually present, but is difficult to deliver in a timely fashion in some jurisdictions. Monitoring of sentinel animals indicates whether MVE transmission to vertebrates is actually occurring. Meteorological surveillance can assist in the prediction of potential MVE virus activity by signalling conditions that have been associated with outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis in humans in the past. Predictive models of MVE virus activity for south-eastern Australia have been developed, but due to the infrequency of outbreaks, are yet to be demonstrated as useful for the forecasting of major outbreaks. Surveillance mechanisms vary across the jurisdictions. Surveillance of human disease occurs in all States and Territories by reporting of cases to health authorities. Sentinel flocks of chickens are maintained in 4 jurisdictions (Western Australia, the Northern Territory, Victoria and New South Wales) with collaborations between Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Mosquito monitoring complements the surveillance of sentinel animals in these jurisdictions. In addition, other mosquito monitoring programs exist in other States (including South Australia and Queensland). Public health control measures may include advice to the general public and mosquito management programs to reduce the numbers of both mosquito larvae and adult vectors. Strategic plans for public health action in the event of MVE virus activity are currently developed or being developed in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria. A southern tri-State agreement exists between health departments of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia and the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. All partners have agreed to co-operate and provide assistance in predicting and combatting outbreaks of mosquito-borne disease in south-eastern Australia. The newly formed National Arbovirus Advisory Committee is a working party providing advice to the Communicable Diseases Network Australia on arbovirus surveillance and control. Recommendations for further enhancement of national surveillance for Murray Valley encephalitis are described

Australia\u27s health 2002 : the eighth biennial report of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare

Australia\u27s Health 2002 is the eighth biennial health report of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. It is the nation\u27s authoritative source of information on patterns of health and illness, determinants of health, the supply and use of health services, and health service costs and performance. Australia\u27s Health 2002 is an essential reference and information resource for all Australians with an interest in health

Severe acute respiratory syndrome surveillance in Australia

In March 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert recommending active worldwide surveillance for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). This paper describes the epidemiological features of cases reported by Australian states an

Border screening for SARS in Australia: what has been learnt?

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the Australian border entry screening program to detect arriving travellers with symptoms of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Design and setting: Descriptive study of outcomes of screening at Australian airports and seaports between 5 April 2003 and 16 June 2003. To determine the number of international travellers who were symptomatic on arrival in Australia but missed by screening, data were obtained on the number of arrivals screened and the number with symptoms (from the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service [AQIS]), as well as the number of people investigated for SARS (from the Australian SARS Case Register). Results: There were 1.84 million arrivals into Australia during the study period, and 794 were referred for screening to AQIS staff. Of these, the findings in four travellers were consistent with the World Health Organization case definition for SARS, and they were referred by the Chief Quarantine Officers to designated hospitals for further investigation. None of these people was confirmed to have SARS. One person reported as a probable SARS case acknowledged being symptomatic on arrival, but had been missed by border screening. Conclusions: The low identification rate was attributed to the low prevalence of SARS, the use of exit screening by affected countries, and the subjective measures used in the screening process. With current knowledge about SARS, border screening should focus on educating incoming travellers, especially groups at high risk of transmitting the disease (the elderly and those with underlying chronic illnesses). Objective screening measures should be used during SARS outbreaks to prevent importation of the disease

Evaluation of Australia's National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System

The Australian National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) is a passive surveillance system that collects information on communicable diseases. The Australian Government manages NNDSS under the auspices of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA). Data collected by each state and territory are collated, analysed and disseminated by the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing. We report the first evaluation of NNDSS since it was established in 1991. Three primary stakeholder groups were surveyed: (a) CDNA members, (b) the National Surveillance Committee and (c) the readership of Communicable Diseases Intelligence, the primary means of data dissemination from NNDSS. The evaluation revealed that the system was acceptable, structurally simple, and that the data collected were actively used by stakeholders. However, the lack of clearly documented aims and objectives for NNDSS, inflexibility to changing needs, lack of timeliness and complexity in processes were seen as problematic. The results of this evaluation, supported by recent federal funding to enhance national biosecurity, will provide the framework for enhancing NNDSS to meet national communicable disease surveillance requirements in Australia